

The Asian Financial Crisis: Crisis, Reform And Recovery

The Asian financial crisis has grown and spread. But China is the one economy in the Asia-Pacific region that has remained apparently unaffected by the present financial turmoil. Will China's financial sector be the next domino to fall? These papers will address this question by examining various pros and cons together with their backgrounds. Contents:China's Economy in 1997 (John Wong)Will China be the Next Financial Domino? (John Wong) Readership: General. Keywords: Presents the first theoretical analysis of the Asian financial crisis and draws out the general lessons of an event whose potential long term effects have been likened to those of the Crash of 1929. Part I presents a factual and analytic overview of what happened: the role of 'vulnerability'; the interconnection between currency crises and financial crises; and why crisis turned into collapse. Part II considers more detailed issues, including how the inflation of non-traded goods prices created vulnerability, welfare-reducing capital inflow owing to under-regulated financial markets, and the onset of speculative attacks. Part III assesses all aspects of contagion, in particular the role of geographic proximity. The final section addresses policy issues. Joseph Stiglitz argues that there is much that can be done to reduce the frequency of crises and to mitigate the severity of crises when they happen. The book finishes with a round-table discussion of policy issues. In the summer of 1997, a wave of economic problems swept across Asia turning the vaunted "Asian Economic Miracle" into the "Asian Economic Crisis". The contributors to this text focus on the political causes and implications of the crisis which underlie the economic collapse. The events of 1997-98 involved not just property values, financial flows, portfolio makeup and debt ratios, they argue, but also the power relationships that shaped those economic indicators. The turmoil that has rocked Asian markets since the middle of 1997, and that is now having such deep effects on the economies in the region, is the third major currency crisis of the 1990s. This study explains how the Asian crisis arose and spread. It then outlines the corrective policy measures that could help end the crisis, and the shortcomings that have been revealed in the international financial system that require reform to reduce the chances of a recurrence.

East Asia in Crisis

East Asian Labor Markets and the Economic Crisis

Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments

From Being a Miracle to Needing One?

China in the Asian Financial Crisis

The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis

As witness to one of the world's great crises in recent times, academics and students, business people, national and international government analysts, policy makers and political leaders worldwide have been pre-occupied by an effort to adequately unravel or sufficiently understand the factors that have brought about the so-called Asian financial, currency or economic crisis and hopefully to find plausible cures or solutions to it. This book examines the impact of economic globalization in developing economies and it applies empirical studies of all of the major countries to theoretical perspectives on the crisis.

Victim, not instigator of the Asian Financial Crisis, Hong Kong was the only economy that succeeded in defending its fully convertible currency, indeed its entire financial system, against speculators, but the price Hong Kong paid for success has been deep recession. Jao gives an objective, even-handed account and analysis of what happened to one of the world's most open economies during that world-rolling event. As an important study of financial events in a globalized economy, Jao's book will be engrossing, cautionary reading for professionals and academics alike, and a major work in the literature on international business, economics, finance, banking, and investment.

The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected—Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has reworked the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 shook the foundations of the global economy. What began as a localised currency crisis soon engulfed the entire Asian region. What went wrong and how did the Asian economies, long considered 'miracles', respond? How did the United States, Japan and other G-7 countries react to the crisis? What role did the IMF play? Why did China, which suffers from many of the same structural problems responsible for the crisis, remain conspicuously insulated from the turmoil raging in its midst? What explains Asia's remarkable recovery just three years after the crisis? In what fundamental ways did the Asian crisis serve as a catalyst to the current thinking about the 'new international financial architecture'? What lessons can be learnt from the crisis by other emerging economies? This book provides answers to all the above questions and more. It gives a comprehensive account of how the international economic order operates, examines its strengths and weaknesses, and what needs to be done to fix it. The book will be vital to students of economics, international political economy, Asian and development studies.

The Impact of Regionalism and the Role of the G20

Birth of the Age of Debt

Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on the Southeast Asian Transitional Economies

Two Crises, Different Outcomes

Asian Responses to the Global Financial Crisis

Nearly ten years after the Asian Financial Crisis, financial turmoil has reappeared - this time it is ravaging the world's wealthiest countries and dragging the global economy along for the ride. It forces one to reflect on the last major financial crisis to afflict the global economy, and to consider whether there are any similarities, and whether there are any lessons from that crisis that we can apply to the current one. Written by a distinguished group of individuals from government, the private sector, international organizations, and academia, this book provides an overview of developments in the main affected countries during the Asian Financial Crisis, as well as the lessons learned and corrective measures taken at the country, regional, and international levels. Importantly, attention is also paid to the areas where substantial improvements are needed. The current crisis heightens the relevance of these lessons. Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis will be invaluable to those studying international relations, international finance, international economics and East Asian studies.

Seminar paper from the year 2012 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Globalization, Political Economics, grade: 1,0, University of Potsdam (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät), language: English, abstract: This paper will deal with the behaviour of the International Monetary Fund during the financial crises in Asia of the 1990s and the current financial crisis in Europe. The main interest lies in whether the political environment in Europe with the third party European Union (EU) and the institutions of the euro area causes a different incentive and power structure leading to a different behaviour on the part of the IMF in the European crisis when compared to the Asian crisis. In Asia, the IMF was confronted with a more or less conventional regional financial crisis and it put together an individual programme for every country asking for help. In Europe on the other hand the EU represents a new, supranational, sovereign institution that has power over its member states and has become the linchpin when dealing with the European financial crisis. My thesis is that the EU-institutions (most notably the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank) took over the role the IMF had in the Asian crisis and now act as the authorities that link the financial aid to conditionalities while the IMF is marginalized into the simple task of providing financial assistance What the paper doesn't want to do: No assessment of the failure or success of the IMFs rescue packages for the Asian and European countries will be given. This goes beyond the initial interest and in case of the European crisis it is too early to assess as the crisis is still ongoing. Furthermore, the paper will abstract from the differences between the crises in Asia and Europe in terms of economic difficulties (exchange rate crisis, crisis of the financial sector, debt crisis). I think this is reasonable considering the focus does not lie on which kind of rescue programmes have been established, but on how the IMF behaved in the process of crisis management. The main part is divided in one segment for the Asian crisis and one for the European crisis. In both I will answer the same three questions: a) what did the institutional environment in which the IMF acted look like? and c) how did the IMF behave and how can this behaviour be explained? By focussing on these three points I will be able to draw a line between the Asian and the European financial crisis and explain why the IMF behaves differently today in Europe than it did in the 1990s in Asia. In a concluding chapter I will summarize my results.

This book looks at the impacts of the Asian economic crisis on the labor market, examining how various countries respondedIt identifies the labour policy reforms needed in areas of unemployment benefit, active labour market programs, support for vulnerable groups and social dialogue.

This book analyzes the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1999. In addition to the issues of financial system restructuring, export-led recovery, crony capitalism, and competitiveness in Asian manufacturing, it examines six key Asian economies--China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. The book makes clear that there is little particularly Asian about the Asian financial crisis. The generic character of the crisis became clear during 1998, when it reached Russia, South Africa, and Brazil. The spread of the crisis reflects the rapid arrival of global capitalism in a world economy not used to the integration of the advanced and developing countries. The book makes recommendations for reform, including the formation of regional monetary bodies, the establishment of an international bankruptcy system, the democratization of international organizations, the infusion of public money to revive the financial and corporate sectors in Pacific Asia, and stronger supervision over financial institutions. The book emphasizes a mismatch in Pacific Asia between investment in physical hardware (e.g., factories and machinery) and in social software (e.g., scientific research centers and administrative and judiciary systems). In a world of growing international competitiveness, concerns over governance will weigh increasingly heavily on unreformed Asian countries. The long-term competitiveness of Asia rests on its getting its institutions right.

The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis

The Social Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis

Responding to Financial Crisis

East Asia and Global Finance

The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications, and Solutions

Origins, implications and solutions

In July 1997, the promise of the 'Asian economic miracle' and the 'Pacific century' devolved into economic chaos and the onset of what has become known as the Asian financial crisis. One by one, many of the region's great economic success stories suffered damage to their financial markets, their currencies, and economic well-being. This volume, the result of an April 1999 conference organized by the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research and the Brookings Institution, examines the sources and lessons of the Asian financial crisis.

Experts from both sides of the Pacific have drawn valuable policy lessons from the failures and successes of four key economies in the region: Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. In examining Taiwan's relative success in weathering the storm, this volume helps explain the widely varying degrees of performance of the region's affected economies. The concluding chapter focuses on general principles for the liberalization of financial markets and stabilization of macroeconomy in developing countries. This work provides much-needed new understanding and reasoned policy lessons to help the Asia-Pacific region meet its vast economic potential. It will be useful for academics and economic policymakers in governments, international organizations, universities, and research institutions, both in the region and beyond, as they assess and implement strategies for more stable regional and global economic development.

This electronic version has been made available under a Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND) open access license. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 shook the foundations of the global economy and what began as a localised currency crisis soon engulfed the entire Asian region. What went wrong and how did the Asian economies long considered 'miracles' respond? How did the United States, Japan and other G-7 countries respond to the crisis? What role did the IMF play? Why did China, which suffers many of the same structural problems responsible for the crisis remain conspicuously insulated from the turmoil raging in its midst? What explains the remarkable recovery now underway in Asia? In what fundamental ways did the Asian crisis serve as a catalyst to the current thinking about the "new international financial architecture"? This book provides answers to all the above questions and more, and gives a comprehensive account of how the international economic order operates, examines its strengths and weaknesses, and what needs to be done to fix it.

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In the summer of 1997, a tidal wave of economic problems swept across Asia. Currencies plummeted, banks failed, GNP stagnated, unemployment soared, and exports stalled. In short, the vaunted "Asian Economic Miracle" became the "Asian Economic Crisis"—with serious repercussions for nations and markets around the world. While the headlines are still fresh, a group of experts on the region presents the first account to focus on the political causes and implications of the crisis. The events of 1997–98 involved not just property values, financial flows, portfolio makeup, and debt ratios, they argue, but also the power relationships that shaped those economic indicators. As they examine the domestic, regional, and international politics that underlay the economic collapse, the authors analyze the reasons why the crisis affected the nations of Asia in radically different ways. The authors also consider whether the crisis indicates a radical change in Asia's economic future.

Liberalization, Growth, and the Asian Financial Crisis

Causes, Contagion and Consequences

IMF and the Asian Financial Crisis

Impacts, Responses & Lessons

An Asian Regulator's View of Unfettered Finance in the 1990s and 2000s

China's Economy and the Asian Financial Crisis

This volume seeks to revisit critical debates on the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis by reexamining its symptoms and causes, as well as lessons from its aftermath. The publication also addresses fundamental issues such as financial liberalization and impacts on regional economic change.

In the space of a few months, across Asia, a miracle became a nightmare. This was the Asian Financial Crisis of 1995-98. In this economic crisis hundreds of people died in rioting, political strong men were removed and hundreds of billions of dollars were lost by investors. This crisis saw the US dollar value of some Asian stock markets decline by ninety percent. Why did almost no one see it coming? The Asian Financial Crisis 1995-98 charts Russell Napier's personal journey during that crisis as he wrote daily for institutional investors about an increasingly uncertain future. Relying on contemporaneous commentary, it charts the mistakes and successes of investors in the battle for investment survival in Asia from 1995-98. This is not just a guide for investors navigating financial markets, but also an explanation of how this crisis created the foundations of an age of debt that has changed the modern world.

In the late 1990s, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia experienced a series of major financial crises evinced by widespread bank insolvencies and currency depreciations, as well as sharp declines in gross domestic production. This sudden disruption of the Asian economic 'miracle' astounded many observers around the world, raised questions about the stability of the international financial system and caused widespread fear that this financial crisis would spread to other countries. What has been called the Asian crisis followed a prolonged slump in Japan dating from the early 1980s and came after the Mexican currency crisis in the mid-1990s. Thus, the Asian crisis became a major policy concern at the International Monetary Fund as well as among developed countries whose cooperation in dealing with such financial crises is necessary to maintain the stability and efficiency of global financial markets. This book collects the papers and discussions delivered at an October 1998 Conference co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the International Monetary Fund to examine the causes, implications and possible solutions to the crises. The conference participants included a broad range of academic, industry, and regulatory experts representing more than thirty countries. Topics discussed included the origin of the individual crises; early warning indicators; the role played by the global financial sector in this crisis; how, given an international safety net, potential risks of moral hazard might contribute to further crises; the lessons for the international financial system to be drawn from the Asian crisis; and what the role of the International Monetary Fund might be in future rescue operations. Because the discussions of these topics include a wide diversity of critical views and opinions, the book offers a particularly rich presentation of current and evolving thinking on the causes and preventions of international banking and monetary crises. The book promises to be one of the timeliest as well as one of the most complete treatments of the Asian financial crisis and its implications for future policymaking.

The Asian Financial CrisisCrisis, reform and recoveryManchester University Press

The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis

Taiwan, Its Neighbors, and the Asian Financial Crisis

The Challenge for Social Policy

Origins, Implications, and Solutions ; [Papers Presented at a Conference Held on Oct. 8 - 10, 1998]

A Comparison of the Behaviour of the IMF in the Asian and European Financial Crises

Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis

Seminar paper from the year 2008 in the subject Tourism, grade: A, The Emirates Academy (The Emirates Academy, Dubai), course: TOUR 301, 10 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: After a period of economic upturn in the beginning of the 1990s, Asia has been concussed by a severe fiscal crisis in 1997. As the name implies the Asian Financial Crisis happened in Asia, more precisely in the Eastern Pacific Part of Asia (see Appendix A). Countries that have been affected most by the crisis are Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand. But also the Philippines, Malaysia, Laos and Hong Kong and even Australia had to deal with the unfavorable situation. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines a crisis as “an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending; especially: one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome” (2008). The Asian-Pacific region counts to the leading tourism destinations in the world because of its rich biodiversity, beautiful beaches, cultural curiosities, a great interpretation of hospitality and nevertheless affordable prices. This report investigates the economic factors which led to the crisis. Further the impacts on the tourism industry are demonstrated and suggestions are made how the crisis probably could have been prevented combined with improvements for the future.

Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, efficient allocation, and strong productive growth that formed the basis for East Asia's success. (World Bank, 1993). Public perception of the Asian economies could hardly have shifted more since that time. Currency depreciation, rising corporate bankruptcy, bank failures, and sovereign bonds downgraded to junk bond status ended the euphoria in Asian emerging markets. Almost overnight, the reputation of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East and South East Asia deteriorated from a model of efficient development to an example of worst crony capitalism. Politicians, rating agencies, and investors were caught off guard by the development of the Asian financial crisis. During the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) in November 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton referred to the financial crisis in Asia as merely a few small glitches in the road. Moody's and Standard and Poor's had upgraded the Philippines long term debt rating a few months earlier and downgraded the affected economies only when the crisis persisted for more than three months. Comparing Thailand's situation to Mexico's economy prior to the peso crisis 1994-1995, the Morgan Stanley star analyst Barton Biggs wrote in January 1997: Thailand's problems are cyclical, not secular. Thailand is not Mexico in late1994. [...]On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the euro and is healthier than Germany. The optimism seemed warranted by a history of high growth in the Asian countries. Before the outbreak of the crisis, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand had experienced uninterrupted growth of more than 5 percent of GDP per year for almost two decades. The economic profession also experienced its Waterloo in Asia. Economists not only failed to predict the crisis; they also failed to recognize the vulnerability of the region. Paul Krugman (1994) in his now famous article in Foreign Affairs was the only well-known economist to doubt the sustainability of rapid growth in East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, even he did not predict this kind of collapse, but rather a gradual economic slowdown of growth. Despite the initial confusion among economists, academic discussion about the Asian financial crisis quickly crystallized around two different explanations of the crisis. One explanation [...]

Abstract: This paper provides an early diagnosis of the financial crisis in Asia, focusing on the empirical record in the lead-up to the crisis. The main goal is to emphasize the role of financial panic as an essential element of the Asian crisis. At the core of the crisis were large-scale foreign capital inflows into financial systems that became vulnerable to panic. The paper finds that while there were significant underlying problems and weak fundamentals besetting the Asian economies at both a macroeconomic and a microeconomic level, the imbalances were not severe enough to warrant a financial crisis of the magnitude that took place in the latter half of 1997. A combination of panic on the part of the international investment community, policy mistakes at the onset of the crisis by Asian governments, and poorly designed international rescue programs turned the withdrawal of foreign capital into a full-fledged financial panic, and deepened the crisis more than was either necessary or inevitable.

This book takes account of the global financial crisis from Asian perspectives, considering Asian responses to the crisis via two key arenas – regionalism in Asia and the G20. The expert contributors – both Asian and Western – illustrate that as G20 members, many Asian countries are now able to showcase their increasing powers and influence on global issues. Within this context, and via multidisciplinary economic and political science perspectives, the book deals with various issues such as World System analysis, the debate between the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus, roles within the G20, and the contribution of 'middle' powers such as Korea and Australia. The application of European experiences to Asia is also considered, as are perspectives from the US. The book concludes that the key to resolving the current global economic crisis lies in how quickly a new global governance and monitoring system can be constructed, and that there are multiple roles for Asian countries to play in its development. Written with a uniquely multidisciplinary approach, this book will prove a fascinating read for a wide-ranging audience encompassing academics, students, researchers and policymakers in a number of fields including Asian studies, economics, public policy and regional studies.

The Global Financial Crisis and Asia

Implications and Challenges

Weathering the Storm

Conference Papers

The Asian Financial Crisis

Lessons for a Resilient Asia

This volume presents a scholarly insider's perspective on the Asian economic crisis, examining the social, economic and political consequences of the crisis in six influential Asian economies: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. Each chapter contains an analysis of the events leading up to and during the crisis, the social impacts and an assessment of possible futures for these countries. The contributors expertise and use of up-to-date data ensures an integrated approach by which the process of economic change can be understood. The book reveals that professional workers in the urban financial sector, as well as manual labourers in the export sector, felt the most dramatic effects. Impacts on the latter group resulted in a significant rise in the population living below the poverty line. The book emphasises the previous absence of strong social security 'nets' and the need to strengthen macroeconomic policies and institutional, legal, regulatory and supervisory structures. Other topics covered include intractable government corruption and fiscal management.

This book analyzes the social impact of the Asian financial crisis and its policy implications. It documents the severe rise in unemployment and its repercussions in the worst-affected countries (the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia) and how this has, to a varying extent, overwhelmed the underdeveloped systems of social protection. It argues that, in light of this experience, urgent action is required both to relieve current social distress and to strengthen systems of social protection. A central policy message is that current programs of policy and institutional reform have to include a basic rethinking of the social dimension of the future model of development. A new social contract, based on full respect for basic labor rights, democracy, and greater social protection needs to be forged. The book argues the case for the introduction of unemployment insurance, the expansion of social assistance, and the strengthening of active labor market policies. The policy issues raised are of relevance not only to the crisis-affected Asian countries but also to other emerging economies that are facing similar challenges in an era of rapid economic and financial globalization.

The first theoretical analysis of the Asian Financial Crisis--perhaps the single most important economic event of the 1990s--starts by presenting a factual and analytic overview of what happened. It goes on to consider why crisis turned into collapse, speculative attacks, and contagion and finishes with a round table discussion of policy issues. The distinguished contributors are from organizations including IMF, the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements. This is vital reading for policy professionals as well as researchers and graduate students in a wide range of disciplines.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 was devastating for the region, but policymakers at least believed that they gained a great deal of knowledge on how to prevent, mitigate, and resolve crises in the future. Fifteen years later, the Asian developing countries escaped the worst effects of the global crisis of 2008-10, in part because they had learned the right lessons from their own experience. In this important study, the Asian Development Bank and Peterson Institute for International Economics join forces to illuminate the con-trast between Asia's performance during the more recent crisis with its performance during its own crisis and the gap between what the United States and European Union leaders recommended to Asia then and what they have practiced on themselves since then. The overriding lessons emerging from the essays in this volume are that countries need to prepare for crises as if they cannot be prevented, make room for stabiliz-ation policies and deploy them rapidly when crises hit, and address the need for self-insurance globally if they can, or regionally if they must. Contributors include Simon Johnson, William R. Cline, Joseph E. Gagnon, Stephan Haggard, Masahiro Kawai, Peter Morgan, Donghyun Park, Arief Ramayandi, Kwanho Shin, Edwin M. Truman, Shahin Vallee, Changyong Rhee, and Lea Sumulong

Crisis, reform and recovery

Lessons for Developing and Transitional Economies in Asia

Facts and Explanations

Lessons From Asia Then, the United States and Europe Now

The Asian Financial Crisis: New International Financial Architecture

The Asian Financial Crisis and the Ordeal of Hong Kong

The current economic crisis in East Asia is unprecedented in world economic history. It seemed the economic strength of the region, until very recently, would just keep growing. Now, the macroeconomic achievements of Asia are under threat and the economies of North America and Europe are feeling the results. This book brings together the thoughts of leading experts on the Asian economy and provides a broad and thorough analysis of the situation. It provides case studies from fourteen countries in the region, how the crisis developed and affected them, and the response from governments. There are other non-country specific chapters with a strong theoretical content which address issues such as causation, how such a crisis should be handled, how it might be avoided in the future, and the likely implications for on-going deregulatory and other economic reforms. This is an important authoritative account of one of the most extraordinary economic events and provides a broad synthesis of case studies and theoretical approaches from a variety of researchers with an intimate knowledge of the region.

This paper analyzes the origins, implications, and solutions for the Asian financial crisis. From the perspective of a member of the Executive Board of the IMF, as Asian problems were building, the IMF overlooked weaknesses in bank and corporate balance sheets in much of Asia: the IMF was unaware of the extraordinary leverage of Korean companies, which in some cases reached a ratio of 600/1 debt to equity. The IMF did not focus on the weak accounting and disclosure practices of banks and nonbanks or generous rollovers of banks to their key clients.

An examination of the political and economic causes and consequences of the Asian financial crises.

This is a unique insider account of the new world of unfettered finance. The author, an Asian regulator, examines how old mindsets, market fundamentalism, loose monetary policy, carry trade, lax supervision, greed, cronyism, and financial engineering caused both the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the global crisis of 2008-9. This book shows how the Japanese zero interest rate policy to fight deflation helped create the carry trade that generated bubbles in Asia whose effects brought Asian economies down. The study's main purpose is to demonstrate that global finance is so interlinked and interactive that our current tools and institutional structure to deal with critical episodes are completely outdated. The book explains how current financial policies and regulation failed to deal with a global bubble and makes recommendations on what must change.

Asian Financial crises

Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications

The Asian Financial Crisis 1995-98

Crisis, Reform and Recovery

The Asian Financial Crisis and the Architecture of Global Finance

Revisiting the Asian Financial Crisis : Essays

"This book collects the papers and discussions delivered at an October, 1998 conference co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the International Monetary Fund to examine the causes, implications and possible solutions to the crises. The conference participants included a broad range of academic, industry, and regulatory experts representing more than thirty countries.

Two Crises, Different Outcomes examines East Asian policy reactions to the two major crises of the last fifteen years: the global financial crisis of 2008-9 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. The calamity of the late 1990s saw a massive meltdown concentrated in East Asia. In stark contrast, East Asia avoided the worst effects of the Lehman Brothers collapse, incurring relatively little damage when compared to the financial devastation unleashed on North America and Europe. Much had changed across the intervening decade, not least that China rather than Japan had become the locomotive of regional growth, and that the East Asian economies had taken numerous steps to buffer their financial structures and regulatory regimes. This time Asia avoided disaster: it bounced back quickly after the initial hit and has been growing in a resilient fashion ever since. The authors of this book explain how the earlier financial crisis affected Asian economies, why government reactions differed so widely during that crisis, and how Asian economies weathered the Great Recession. Drawing on a mixture of single-country expertise and comparative analysis, they conclude by assessing the long-term prospects that Asian countries will continue their recent success.

This book demonstrates how Asian countries tried to minimize the impact of the global financial crisis, identifies structural weaknesses in their economies, and discusses policy options for strengthening Asian economies to avoid future crises and promote sustainable growth in the long-term.

When are policy makers willing to make costly adjustments to their macroeconomic policies to mitigate balance-of-payments problems? Which types of adjustment strategies do they choose? Under what circumstances do they delay reform, and when are such delays likely to result in financial crises? To answer these questions, this book examines how macroeconomic policy adjustments affect individual voters in financially open economies and argues that the anticipation of these distributional effects influences policy makers' decisions about the timing and the type of reform. Empirically, the book combines analyses of cross-national survey data of voters' and firms' policy evaluations with comparative case studies of national policy responses to the Asian financial crisis of 1997/8 and the recent global financial crisis in Eastern Europe. The book shows that variation in policy makers' willingness to implement reform can be traced back to differences in the vulnerability profiles of their countries' electorates.

Ten Years After

The Causes and Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis

From Asian to Global Financial Crisis

The widely held view of the Asian Financial Crisis is that it had no substantial impact on China. In fact, the country was far more vulnerable than most people realized, due to the high possibility of financial contagion entering the system from Hong Kong through Guangdong province. This book analyzes the severe policy challenge that it presented for China's leaders. The crisis in Guangdong's financial institutions provided a forewarning of the difficulties that lay ahead as China's integration with the global financial system deepened. The experience of Guangdong in the Asian Financial Crisis provided a profound lesson for China's policy-makers as they planned the country's strategy for financial reform in the following years. China was able to avoid disaster by astute and difficult policy choices, in the face of fierce pressure from outside the country, as well as from different domestic interests at many different levels. The successful resolution of the crisis provided a breathing space for the leadership. It gave it time to undertake necessary reforms in the country's financial system in the decade that followed the crisis.

This work examines the effects of financial liberalization of the more advanced economies in Southeast Asia and analyses the degree to which emerging and transitional economies in East and South Asia can benefit from this example.